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IMPLEMENTING ANTITRUST’S 
WELFARE GOALS 
Herbert Hovenkamp* 
INTRODUCTION 
The dominant view of antitrust policy in the United States is that it 
should promote some version of economic welfare.  More specifically, 
antitrust promotes allocative efficiency by ensuring that markets are as 
competitive as they can practicably be and that firms do not face 
unreasonable roadblocks to attaining productive efficiency, which refers to 
both cost minimization and innovation.  A highly competitive market 
containing small firms with high costs and little incentive to innovate is not 
desirable.  Such a market might be allocatively efficient in the sense that 
prices are held close to cost, but costs would be too high.  Antitrust would 
also not prefer a world of dominant firms unless dominance was essential to 
maintaining technological progress or cost reduction, but the prevailing 
literature suggests that this is not the case:  greater structural 
competitiveness is typically conducive to greater innovation as well.1  
Tradeoffs between allocative and productive efficiency may occasionally be 
necessary, but the overall goal is markets that maximize output, whether 
measured by quantity or quality. 
Antitrust in the United States is also dedicated to the proposition that 
markets usually work by themselves to attain these results, provided that 
property and contract rights are adequately defined.  As a result, 
intervention must be episodic and applied only when good reasons exist for 
thinking that antitrust will make a market perform more consistently with 
these goals. 
One welfare concern that has dominated debates over U.S. antitrust 
policy over the last several decades is whether antitrust should adopt a 
“consumer welfare” principle rather than a more neoclassical “total 
welfare” principle.  “Total welfare” refers to the aggregate value that an 
economy produces, without regard for the way that gains or losses are 
distributed.  For example, if a product costs $5 to make and is sold for $8, 
the $3 surplus goes to the seller.  On the other side, if a customer would 
have been willing to pay $10 for a product but is able to purchase it for $8, 
then this $2 surplus is value added to the consumer.  A perfectly 
 
*  Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa. 
 1. CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT:  
PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION ch. 1 (2012). 
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competitive market maximizes total welfare, at least when we are not 
concerned about innovation.  Significantly, however, a perfectly 
competitive market also gives most of the surplus to consumers, because 
firms compete to the point that price equals marginal cost. 
Formally, “consumer welfare” looks only at the surplus that goes to 
consumers, ignoring what goes to sellers.  The consumer welfare principle 
must therefore be counted as “distributive” to the extent that it produces 
outcomes that shift wealth or resources in favor of consumers even though 
an alternative outcome would produce greater total wealth. 
Suppose, for example, that a joint venture among the firms that dominate 
a market simultaneously (1) facilitates a collusive output reduction that 
raises consumer prices but (2) reduces the firms’ variable costs by 
permitting them to share production or distribution processes.  In some 
cases, the cost reduction might be so great that even the cartel price is lower 
than the pre-venture price.2  In that case this joint venture should be 
approved under general welfare grounds because it increases total wealth.  
It would also be approved under the consumer welfare principle because 
consumers actually benefit.3 
Suppose that the joint venture produces significant gains in production 
costs of, say, $100; however, it also facilitates a price fix that raises the 
overall price level by $80.  In that case, the joint venture would be efficient 
under total welfare criteria because the productive efficiency gains exceed 
the allocative efficiency losses that result from the collusion.4  The gains to 
the firms are described as “productive” efficiency gains because they result 
from economies in producing or distributing.  The losses to consumers in 
this case are described as “allocative” efficiency losses because they result 
from a decrease in market competitiveness.  In this situation, the general 
welfare criterion would approve the restraint because gains are larger than 
losses, while the consumer welfare criterion would condemn it because 
consumers are worse off.  That is, antitrust under the consumer welfare 
principle could be used to condemn an efficient practice, provided that 
“efficiency” is equated with the maximization of total welfare. 
In The Antitrust Paradox, the late Robert Bork famously argued that 
antitrust law should adopt what he termed a “consumer welfare” standard 
 
 2. See, e.g., Alan A. Fisher, Robert H. Lande & Walter Vandaele, Afterword:  Could a 
Merger Lead to Both a Monopoly and a Lower Price?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1697, 1698–99 
(1983). 
 3. A likely example is Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 
441 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1979), where the Supreme Court upheld a nonexclusive “blanket license” 
agreement under which thousands of artists agreed to the same royalty rates for electronic 
performances of their music.  The reduced transaction costs of blanket licensing almost 
certainly resulted in lower output prices to consumers. See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra 
note 1, at 345–47. 
 4. The classic exposition is Oliver E. Williamson, Economies As an Antitrust Defense:  
The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968). See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL 
ANTITRUST POLICY:  THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 12.2b (4th ed. 2011). 
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for illegality but then equated this standard with general welfare.5  Bork’s 
observations started a debate that is ongoing and has produced hundreds of 
articles.  The debate has both historical, or positive, as well as normative 
aspects.  The historical debate concerns mainly whether the original intent 
of the framers of the Sherman Act was a general welfare test for legality, a 
consumer welfare test, or perhaps some alternative test.6  The normative 
debate is concerned with whether general welfare or consumer welfare 
should be the antitrust goal. 
The simple version of the consumer welfare test is not a balancing test in 
the sense that one must attempt to measure and net out productive 
efficiency gains and allocative efficiency losses.  If consumers are harmed 
(either by reduced output or product quality or by higher prices resulting 
from the exercise of market power), then this fact trumps any amount of 
offsetting gains to producers and presumably to others.  Theoretically, even 
a minor injury to consumers outweighs significant efficiency gains.  In this 
sense, the consumer welfare test is easier to administer on a case-by-case 
basis than general welfare tests.  Under a simple rule of reason test 
employing the consumer welfare principle, one would have to consider 
whether the challenged practice creates a sufficient inference of lower 
market-wide output and higher prices.  If so, it is presumptively unlawful.  
At that time the defendants will have an opportunity to show that the output 
model ignores efficiencies that the challenged practice produces and also 
that these efficiencies are of sufficient magnitude so as to drive down the 
venture’s profit-maximizing price to a level that is no higher than it had 
been before the venture was formed. 
By contrast, a general welfare test requires a cardinal assessment of net 
gains or losses.  To be sure, some cases are not particularly difficult.  For 
example, naked price fixing, unaccompanied by any integration of research, 
production, or output, produces no measurable efficiency gains and leads 
directly to higher prices.  So total welfare “balancing” is relatively easy.  
On the other side, many purely vertical practices, including vertical 
territorial restraints, tying or exclusive dealing, may not result in higher 
 
 5. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX:  A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 66, 97 
(1978); see also Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343–45 (1979) (identifying 
consumer welfare as a goal in a decision holding that end-use consumers had standing to 
bring an overcharge action against price fixers); Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice 
and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 4–6 (1982); Alan J. Meese, Debunking 
the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of the Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us a 
Total Welfare Standard and Why We Should Keep It, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 659, 690–98 (2010). 
 6. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, § 2.1 (evaluating the debate); Robert H. Bork, 
Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 13 (1966) (arguing 
that the drafters of the Sherman Act had a general welfare test in mind); Robert H. Lande, 
Wealth Transfers As the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust:  The Efficiency 
Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 86–87 (1982) (disagreeing with Bork and 
arguing that the drafters had a consumer welfare test in mind); see also HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE:  PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION ch. 2 (2005) 
(agreeing largely with Stigler); George J. Stigler, The Origin of the Sherman Act, 
14 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 7 (1985) (arguing that Congress’s real concern was protecting small 
business from more efficient larger firms). 
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consumer prices at all and have efficiency benefits that serve to explain 
them.  Alternatively, a joint venture of firms who lack significant power is 
likely to preserve productive efficiency gains without consumer losses.  
Balancing should be easy. 
In the middle, however, are joint ventures with some integrative function, 
mergers, many unilateral practices, and at least a few vertical practices, 
including some instances of resale price maintenance, exclusive dealing, 
and tying.  What these practices have in common is that under the right 
circumstances they can serve as an opportunity for exercising market 
power, but they can also produce considerable efficiencies.  In these cases, 
the market power requirement, which applies in some fashion to all of 
them, serves to distinguish cases where there is no consumer harm because 
a market-wide output reduction is impossible.  If market power is present, 
then the case is much more difficult. 
I.  THE TRIVIALITY OF THE CONSUMER WELFARE DEBATE 
The volume and complexity of the academic debate on the general 
welfare compared to consumer welfare question creates an impression of 
policy significance that is completely belied by the case law, and largely by 
government enforcement policy.  Few if any decisions have turned on the 
difference.  In fact, antitrust policy generally applies both tests in the 
following sense.  First, the economic analysis from the dominant Harvard 
and Chicago schools of antitrust is consistently concerned with general 
welfare, although the schools may entertain different assumptions about the 
robustness of markets and the merits of intervention.  Harvard school 
antitrust economists began to look at total welfare consequences at least as 
early as the 1930s.7  The Chicago school has also consistently followed a 
total welfare approach, ignoring distributional concerns and focusing on the 
extent to which an assortment of practices are likely to impose welfare 
losses in the neoclassical sense.8 
The principal historical difference between the Harvard and Chicago 
school approaches is that Chicago has been somewhat more optimistic 
about the robustness of markets and their corrective mechanisms, and 
somewhat more pessimistic about the value of government intervention.  As 
 
 7. See, e.g., Edward S. Mason, The Current Status of the Monopoly Problem in the 
United States, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1266–71 (1949); Edward S. Mason, Monopoly in Law 
and Economics, 47 YALE L.J. 34 (1937).  These concerns continued to dominate, even to the 
present day, and the antitrust law treatise has consistently followed them since its inception 
in the late 1970s. See also Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis:  
1890–1955, 94 MINN. L. REV. 311, 348–50 (2009); Meese, supra note 5, at 692–94; Richard 
A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 928 (1979). 
 8. E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001); Frank H. Easterbrook, The 
Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (1984); Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies 
and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1981); Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical 
Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135 (1984); Richard A. Posner, 
The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution:  Per Se Legality, 
48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 9 (1981). 
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a result, Chicago school writers have seen more room for rules of per se 
legality, particularly in the areas of unilateral restraints and vertical 
practices.9  Harvard theory observes the same issues but typically prefers a 
rule of reason approach, making violations difficult to prove but not ruling 
them out altogether.10  The economic thinking of the two schools is much 
closer together today, however, than it was in the 1960s and earlier.11  
Where there are differences, the Supreme Court has almost uniformly 
followed the Harvard rather than the Chicago school approach.12 
For example, the Harvard school literature on such complex practices as 
exclusionary pricing, mergers, refusals to deal or license, and joint ventures 
generally applies a total welfare approach, trying to identify circumstances 
when these practices are competitively harmful on balance and what are the 
evidentiary criteria for evaluating them.13  Today, the dominant views, 
which are those of the Harvard school, are that anticompetitive predatory 
pricing is rare but perhaps not impossible;14 that most instances of resale 
price maintenance are competitively benign, but there may be specific 
instances of anticompetitive Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) at the behest 
of a powerful dealer or cartels of dealers;15 and that unilateral refusals to 
deal rarely lead to market-wide output reductions.16 
Most of these practices remain controversial.  Commentators take a 
variety of positions on them, irrespective of “school,” but in the courts, the 
aggregation of these views leads to a set of presumptions about the general 
class of cases and the amount and nature of the proof that plaintiffs must 
produce.  The case law generally assigns and weighs presumptions 
depending on the court’s opening assessment of the degree of danger that a 
 
 9. See Posner, supra note 8, at 6.  
 10. See 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW (3d ed. 2010).  
 11. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Costs of Movement, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 67, 75 
(2012).  
 12. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Chicago and Harvard Schools and the Dominant Firm 
(U. Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-19), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1014153; Herbert Hovenkamp, Harvard, Chicago and Transaction 
Cost Economics in Antitrust Analysis, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 613 (2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1592476. 
 13. See generally 12–13 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10 (3d ed. 2012) (joint 
ventures, standard setting and related horizontal collaborative conduct); 9–11 id. (3d ed. 
2010 & 2011) (tying and exclusive dealing); 4–5 id. (3d ed. 2009) (mergers); 8 id. (3d ed. 
2010) (vertical intrabrand restraints including resale price maintenance); 3–3B id. (3d ed. 
2008) (unilateral exclusionary practices including pricing and refusal to deal). 
 14. See 3A id. ¶¶ 720–21.  
 15. See 8 id. ¶ 1604 (3d ed. 2010).  To be sure, resale price maintenance may lead to 
higher prices, but in a case of manufacturer initiated RPM, the higher prices are not the 
consequence of an exercise of market power and market-wide output reduction, but rather of 
pricing that fully internalizes distribution costs. See infra notes 43–45 and accompanying 
text. 
 16. 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, ¶¶ 770–77.  For important qualifications 
in network industries, see BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ch. 11. 
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restraint imposes.  If a category of practices is strongly regarded as benign, 
plaintiffs will face stringent proof requirements, and vice versa.17 
Second, however, if the evidence in a particular case indicates that a 
challenged practice facilitates the exercise of market power, resulting in 
output that is actually lower and prices that are actually higher, then 
tribunals uniformly condemn the restraint without regard to offsetting 
efficiencies.  Indeed, one is hard pressed to find a single appellate decision 
that made finding of fact that a challenged practice resulted in lower 
market-wide output and higher prices but that also went on to approve the 
restraint because proven efficiencies exceeded consumer losses.  In sum, 
courts almost invariably apply a consumer welfare test. 
To be sure, many cases approve restraints after finding likely or possible 
efficiencies, without detailed inquiry into output effects.18  But these cannot 
be read as indicating that the restraint would be lawful even if consumer 
harm had been shown.  Rather, they indicate that proof of efficiencies will 
be sufficient to justify a venture in situations where actual consumer effects 
are unknown, and theorizing about the class of restraints in question is 
probabilistic and dependent on case specific assumptions.  Indeed, in many 
of these cases, the courts cite factors such as nonexclusivity, indicating that 
an output reduction is highly unlikely even if the firms wished to have 
one.19  That is to say, the courts do not balance proven consumer harm 
against likely or even proven producer gains.  Rather, they insist on a 
showing of actual consumer harm, and if they find it they condemn the 
restraint. 
This approach is consistent with the one taken in the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines.  First, the agency applies a variety of tests for unilateral or 
collusive market effects to see if the merger is likely to result in a market-
wide output reduction and price increase.  If the answer is no, the query is 
abandoned.  If the answer is yes, then the proponents of the merger will 
have an opportunity to show compensating efficiencies.  But the magnitude 
of the efficiencies must be sufficiently large to offset any predicted price 
 
 17. This is reflected in the Supreme Court decisions setting standards for pleading 
requirements, as well as for summary judgment without a trial. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553–63 (2007) (pleading requirements); Matsushita Elec. Indus. 
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–88 (1986) (summary judgment); see also 
2 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, ¶¶ 307–08 (3d ed. 2008) (pleading and summary 
judgment). 
 18. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2006) (approving a production 
joint venture; no inquiry into whether prices increased); Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 
756 (1999) (requiring a full rule of reason test for professional association’s restrictions on 
price and quality advertising and requiring a showing of competitive impact; case ultimately 
dismissed when such impact could not be proven). 
 19. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 11 (1979) 
(nonexclusivity of blanket license made consumer price increases highly unlikely); see also 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, § 5.2a2 (importance of nonexclusivity in assessment of certain 
joint ventures). 
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increase.  In sum, the merger will be permitted only where there is no 
consumer harm, regardless of the size of the efficiencies.20 
Even the Chicago school theory of optimal sanctions, which would base 
damages on the sum of the overcharge plus the deadweight loss,21 indicates 
a modified consumer welfare approach.  By measuring damages as it does, 
the optimal sanctions approach permits conduct to proceed when efficiency 
gains are greater than the deadweight loss, but terminates the conduct if 
efficiency gains are less.22  That is, it permits efficient conduct but 
forecloses inefficient conduct.  However, assuming that the damages are 
actually paid to consumers, they are made whole by this approach—that is, 
the theory resembles Kaldor-Hicks, or potential Pareto, efficiency in that it 
requires that the gains be large enough to compensate for the losses, but in 
this case, it also requires actual compensation for the losses out of the gains.  
As a result, consumers will be no worse off, and sellers will be able to 
pocket the gains to the extent that they exceed consumer harm. 
The optimal sanctions model suggests that the general welfare principle 
for antitrust develops a form of Pareto efficiency, while the consumer 
welfare model develops a form of potential Pareto efficiency in which 
actual compensation of losers is required.  If producers gain from the 
practice more than consumers lose and the gainers are required to 
compensate the losers, then we effectively have the consumer welfare 
principle. 
In sum, antitrust policy in the United States follows a consumer welfare 
approach in that it condemns restraints that actually result in monopoly 
output reductions, whether or not there are offsetting efficiencies and 
regardless of their size.  To the extent that damages rather than an 
injunction are appropriate, the approach may permit efficient restraints that 
harm consumers, but only after consumers are adequately compensated.  If 
they cannot be adequately compensated, and consumers remain harmed, 
then antitrust policy condemns the restraint. 
II.  ADMINISTRABILITY 
Aside from other rationales, a consumer welfare approach to antitrust’s 
goals is generally justified on administrative grounds.  As Williamson’s 
original “welfare tradeoff” model indicates, a total welfare approach to 
antitrust harm would require courts to routinely balance out consumer 
injuries from allocative inefficiencies against firm gains attributable to 
 
 20. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES § 10 (Aug. 19, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/
hmg-2010.pdf. 
 21. This number must be adjusted by the inverse of the probability of detection.  For 
example, U.S. antitrust law’s mandatory treble damages are correct on the premise that the 
probability of detection and successful prosecution is one in three. 
 22. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, § 17.2b; William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for 
Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 652 (1983); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 
The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 
880 (1979). 
 2478 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
production efficiencies.  Importantly, this balance would not measure the 
overcharge, which is a wealth transfer, but rather the allocative efficiency, 
or “deadweight” loss.  This is clear from the highlighted areas in 
Williamson’s well-known figure on the antitrust welfare tradeoff.  This loss 
results from unmade sales and inefficient substitutions and is much more 
difficult to assess than simple overcharges.  This loss must then be balanced 
against production efficiency gains.  If true quantification of deadweight 
consumer losses and producer gains were required, antitrust would be way 
outside of its competence.  Rather, it confines its analysis to situations 
where there is no deadweight loss at all because prices do not increase or 
where there are no producer gains at all because the practice is naked or 
nearly so. 
Figure 1:  Williamson’s Welfare Tradeoff Model23 
 
 
The system that we actually have requires one to show only higher prices 
resulting from the exercise of market power.  It requires a complex 
calculation of the magnitude of resulting efficiencies only in a very few 
cases, some of which are discussed below.  When courts do dismiss 
antitrust complaints on “welfare” grounds, it is because they have 
concluded that there is very likely no deadweight loss at all. 
Protection of consumer welfare is also most consistent with the 
“disaggregation” rule that U.S. courts apply in certain cases, particularly 
those involving collaborative activity such as joint ventures and some 
mergers.  Some so-called joint ventures are nothing more than fronts for 
cartels, and in these cases the venture itself can be enjoined.  Often, 
 
 23. The figure comes from Williamson, supra note 4, at 21. 
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however, the venture as a whole is quite beneficial, but particular rules or 
practices seem unreasonably anticompetitive.  Good examples are the 
NCAA rule restricting nationally televised college football games, which 
the Supreme Court condemned in 1984,24 and the Supreme Court’s more 
recent American Needle decision,25 which concluded that an exclusive 
marketing agreement covering all NFL teams’ individually held trademarks 
should be treated as a collusive rather than unilateral act.26  The same thing 
roughly applies to mergers among firms that have multiple products, plants, 
or stores.  Under the government agencies’ “fix it first” approach, the 
merging parties may have to spin off assets in markets where a price 
increase is threatened but be permitted to continue with the balance of the 
merger.27 
Both the NCAA in collegiate sports and the NFL in professional football 
are highly efficient joint ventures.  No one in these cases was urging that 
they be dismantled.  Rather, in such situations courts isolate the challenged 
practice, determine whether it is likely to harm consumers, and then 
consider whether the practice is reasonably necessary to the operation of the 
venture.  If not, then the court can enjoin the practice while leaving the 
balance of the venture intact.  If the practice is necessary to the venture’s 
operation, however, then the court has no choice but to consider whether the 
venture as a whole is competitively beneficial or competitively harmful.  
Once again, I do not know of a single case that has upheld such a venture 
after a fact finding to the effect that the venture actually raised consumer 
prices by facilitating a market-wide output reduction.  Analogous inferences 
apply to multimarket mergers, where particular groupings of sales 
threatening consumer harm can be isolated and tied off in some cases but 
not others. 
I state two propositions about the courts’ and enforcement agencies’ 
approaches to antitrust welfare issues, one of which has just been 
developed, and the second is further developed below:  (1) When a practice 
produces unambiguous consumer losses in the form of short-run reduced 
output or higher prices, immediate cost savings to producers do not serve as 
an antitrust defense, no matter what their size; further, claims of long-run 
gains to producers are ignored once actual consumer harm is found.  
(2) When a practice has ambiguous effects on consumers, perhaps because 
it harms some but benefits others, but the effects cannot be netted out and 
quantified, then producer gains resulting from efficiency may become 
relevant.  These are antitrust’s hardest consumer welfare cases.  In them, 
measurable output effects are particularly important. 
 
 24. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 25. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010). 
 26. Id. at 2214–15. 
 27. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER 
REMEDIES § IV.A.1 (June 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/
272350.pdf. 
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II.  CONSUMER WELFARE’S HARD CASES 
Williamson’s welfare tradeoff model, which he acknowledged to be 
“naïve,”28 treats consumers as if they are all alike.  The higher prices and 
deadweight loss applies to all of them.  Things are often not that simple.  
Many practices affect different consumers in different ways.  They may 
injure some, benefit others, and leave still others indifferent.  As a result, 
net consumer harm may be exceedingly difficult to measure.  Measuring net 
consumer harm in such cases requires identifying those consumers who 
gain and those who lose, and then quantifying their gains and losses.  In 
some cases, such as where output increases under the challenged practice, 
we would also have to identify consumers that were not in the market at all 
until the practice brought them in.  This group is always benefitted by the 
practice. 
In sum, when consumers are affected differently by a challenged practice, 
computing net consumer harm or benefit can be just as difficult as 
computing net benefit under a general welfare test when the practice creates 
both producer gains and consumer losses.  In that case, the fact finder might 
want to consider some other things.  For example, when a practice causes 
both consumer harm and consumer benefit but net effects are unknown, 
producer gains may become more relevant, particularly if they result from 
significant production efficiencies.  Second, output effects may be helpful.  
In most cases, neither will be dispositive. 
This section briefly examines some practices that fall into this category, 
mainly, (1) variable proportion ties; (2) ties that result in interproduct price 
discrimination; (3) tying and bundled discounts of imperfect complements; 
(4) vertical restraints and other practices used to facilitate third-degree price 
discrimination; and (5) resale price maintenance which causes nominally 
higher prices but produces services that are more valuable to some 
customers than to others.  This list is not meant to be exhaustive. 
A.  Variable Proportion Ties 
In a variable proportion tie, a firm typically sells a durable good together 
with one or more consumable complements in variable proportions.29  For 
example, in one famous old case, the defendant sold a mimeograph copy 
machine subject to a requirement that purchasers buy its ink and stencils; 
and in another case, a refrigeration box was sold on the condition that 
customers use only the seller’s dry ice.30  These firms are engaging in a 
 
 28. Williamson, supra note 4, at 21. 
 29. See 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, ¶ 1711; Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Harm, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 943–50 (2010). 
 30. See Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33 (1931) (same, 
tying patented refrigeration box and dry ice); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film 
Mfg., 243 U.S. 502, 517–19 (1917) (condemning tie of movie projector and motion pictures 
in a patent infringement suit); Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 17, 36, 49 (1912) 
(approving the tie in a patent infringement suit); see also BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra 
note 1, chs. 10, 13. 
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type of second-degree price discrimination by dropping the price of the 
primary, or tying, good and increasing the price of a tied good.31  In second-
degree price discrimination the seller typically offers a common set of terms 
to all, and buyers indirectly select the amount of the seller’s return by 
making a collateral decision, such as the amount they wish to purchase.  In 
the variable proportion tie, the seller earns a higher return from those who 
purchase a great deal of the tied good than from those who purchase smaller 
amounts.  Such tying arrangements have produced voluminous private 
antitrust litigation in the United States.32  These cases have also been 
ubiquitous in the franchise industry, where variable proportion tying is a 
common mechanism for reducing franchisee entry costs and enlarging 
franchisor profits through price discrimination.  The price of the franchise 
(the tying product) is often zero, but is in any event much lower than the 
standalone value of the franchise.  For example, a nondominant franchisor 
may give franchises to firms at no charge but then tie food products or other 
consumables and place an overcharge on these.33  Once again, the 
franchisor earns more from higher volume franchises. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 31. See, e.g., Xerox Corp. v. Media Scis., Inc., 660 F. Supp. 2d 535, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (“As is true of other printers manufacturers, Xerox generally sells its printers at a low 
margin or a loss, hoping to earn a profit through later sales of high margin ink.”); see also 
Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 33 
(1957). 
 32. See, e.g., In re Apple iPod iTunes Anti-trust Litig., Nos. C 05-00037 JW, C 07-
06507 JW, 2010 WL 2629907, at *1, 7–10 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2010) (denying summary 
judgment on claim that Apple unlawfully tied its iTunes media library to various Apple 
devices); Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 861, 881–
85 (E.D. Ky. 2007) (denying summary judgment on a claim of tying printers and print 
cartridges via technological tie); see also In re Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litig., No. C 05-
00037 JW, 2011 WL 5864036, at *1, 4–5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2011) (granting class 
certification). 
 33. See, e.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 46–47 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. 
denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972) (franchise fee of zero, tying consumable products at 
overcharge). 
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Figure 2 
 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the complex consumer impact of variable proportion 
ties.  The vertical axis measures consumers’ surplus, while the horizontal 
axis measures the number of tied units that the consumer purchases.  The 
solid line gives consumers’ surplus under tying and the dotted line without 
tying.  Consumers are divided into three categories arrayed along the 
horizontal axis.34  The low preference category consists of consumers who 
would not be in the market at all at standalone pricing, but who enter the 
market in response to the tying product price cut.  For example, a firm 
selling computer printers at a standalone price of $400 might cut the price 
to $200 but then charge $20 for an ink cartridge that would otherwise sell 
for $10.  These low preference consumers would not be in the market at all 
under single product pricing, but the lower printer price induces them to 
purchase a printer and at least one cartridge. 
For customers who are brought into the market in this fashion, the tie is 
an unqualified welfare gain from zero to whatever surplus they achieve 
from entering the market.  The magnitude of their aggregate gains depends 
on the size of the printer output increase in response to the price cut, and 
this can be very large when the demand curve is convex to the origin and is 
fairly shallow in the higher output reaches.  This fact explains why one 
 
 34. They are actually divided into four categories.  At the extreme left next to the origin, 
the unnamed space consists of consumers who do not even purchase the tying product at the 
reduced price under the tying arrangement.  Since they are out of the market under both 
tying and independent sales, they are indifferent to the tie. 
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observes so many variable proportion ties in product differentiated markets 
that are competitively structured, such as franchising.  The gains do not 
result from the seller’s ability to charge seriously supracompetitive prices to 
high intensity users, something that lack of market power prevents them 
from doing.  Rather, they come from the very large numbers of new users 
that come into the market under the variable proportion tie. 
The middle group of customers consists of those who would have been in 
the market under standalone pricing, but for them the price decrease in the 
printer is greater than the price increase in the cartridges.  For example, if 
someone in our illustration used fewer than twenty printer cartridges over 
the printer’s lifetime he or she would come out ahead under tying.35  The 
size of this group depends on a number of factors.  One factor is the 
durability of the tying product and the amount of tied product used during 
its lifetime.  Another is whether the tie is airtight.  For example, many 
printer manufacturers attempt to tie cartridges, but their success is limited to 
the extent that customers or third parties can refill cartridges or produce 
generics.36  A third factor is the depth of the tying product price cut and the 
height of the tied product price increase.  Finally, this group experiences 
some deadweight lost to the extent that they treat the printer price as a fixed 
cost and the cartridge cost as variable, because they will do less printing. 
The third group of “high” intensity buyers is made worse off by the tie.  
They are the ones that use more than twenty cartridges in our illustration.  
As a result, the higher cartridge prices more than offset the lower printer 
price. 
Whether consumers in the aggregate are better or worse off from such an 
arrangement would be nearly impossible to assess.  Even if we could 
measure the output effects of the tie, that would not be a measure of 
welfare, which consists of the surplus value above the price.  Theoretically, 
we could plot how many cartridges each customer bought.  Losses would be 
the cartridge overcharge paid by the highest intensity group, less printer 
cost savings, plus the deadweight loss caused by their reduced printing.  
Consumer gains in the middle group would be the lower price of the printer 
less the overcharges on the cartridges they purchase, although their 
marginal printing cost could be higher, also creating a small deadweight 
loss.  The most difficult group to measure would be the lowest intensity 
 
 35. A user of nineteen cartridges over the lifetime of the printer would spend an 
additional $190 on cartridges, but would have saved $200 on the printer itself. 
 36. This is a principal issue in the ongoing Lexmark litigation in which Lexmark 
attempted to use a microprocessor that required the printer to be able to “read” a particular 
cartridge before it would work, but third parties were able to emulate the microprocessor.  
See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 547–48 (6th Cir. 
2004) (discussing how a third party’s evasion of a microprocessor lock very likely did not 
violate the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which can bar the circumvention of 
technological locks on copyrighted material); see also Static Control Components, Inc. v. 
Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 697 F.3d 387 (6th Cir. 2012) (rejecting antitrust claims and invalidating 
some design patents intended to make a generic cartridge producers product incompatible 
with the manufacturer’s printers). 
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buyers who are not in the market at all prior to tying.  In order to quantify 
their gains we would need to know not only how many additional units they 
purchased but also how much surplus they achieved from those 
transactions, very likely an impossible number to determine. 
Further, two additional elements of consumer benefit may need to be 
considered.  First, for manufactured goods such as printers and cartridges, 
there are likely to be economies of scale in production that enable the 
manufacturer to achieve lower costs at higher volume.  Even the high 
preference users could be better off if cost savings resulting from higher 
output were passed on, as they would ordinarily be. 
Second, if both the tying and tied good are sold in markets that are not 
strongly competitive, the tie is likely to eliminate a certain amount of 
double marginalization, which occurs when two sellers supply vertically 
related or complementary goods that are consumed together, and each of 
them has some market power.37 
B.  Ties Causing Interproduct Price Discrimination 
“Interproduct” price discrimination occurs when a tie joins two (or more) 
goods upon which buyers place not only different values, but value them in 
different ways.  Such ties can be either fixed or variable proportion, 
although the fixed-proportion version is much easier to analyze.  
Historically the most famous example is block booking, which occurs when 
movies, television shows, or other productions are sold only in bundles, or 
“blocks.”38  Suppose that a firm is offering to license two films called 
Alpha and Beta to two different customers.  Given that the films have 
already been made, marginal costs are close to zero.  The two customers 
place a positive value on each movie, but their valuations (willingness to 
pay, or WTP) differs, as follows: 
 
 
 
 
First, suppose that the seller decides to license the two movies 
individually.  It has some pricing choices.  It can charge the higher price for 
each movie and license to only one buyer.  That is, Customer 1 would 
 
 37. See infra Part II.C.  On double marginalization in tying, see BOHANNAN & 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ch. 2; Erik N. Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying 
Arrangements, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY (Daniel 
Sokol & Roger D. Blair eds., forthcoming 2013); Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 29, 
at 958–61.  In the case of complementary products, the theory of double marginalization is 
sometimes referred to as “Cournot Complements,” because Cournot applied his theory of 
oligopoly pricing to producers of complements as well as competitors. Hovenkamp & 
Hovenkamp, supra note 29, at 959 n.122.  
 38. See, e.g., United States v. Lowe’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962) (per se unlawful).  On 
television shows, see MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 
1999) (per se unlawful); see also Thomas A. Lambert, Appropriate Liability Rules for Tying 
and Bundled Discounting, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 909, 967–68 (2011). 
 Alpha Beta
Customer 1 10 5
Customer 2 3 11
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purchase a license to Alpha at a price of 10 and Customer 2 would license 
Beta at a price of 11.  Total profits would be 21 and consumer surplus 
would be zero.  Alternatively, the seller could charge the lower price and 
license to both customers.  Alpha would obtain a price of 3 from each 
customer, producing earnings of six.  Consumer surplus would be 7.  For 
Beta the license price would be 5 and the seller’s total revenue would be 10.  
Consumers’ surplus would be 6.  In this case, the seller’s profits would be 
16 and total consumers’ surplus would be 13.  Finally, the seller could tie 
the two movies together at a price of 14.  In that case, it would sell to both 
customers, earning 28 in profits.  Consumers’ surplus would be 1. 
Note that consumers’ surplus under tying, which is 1, is much less than 
consumers’ surplus under the second unbundled choice, which is 13.  
However, if tying were unlawful there is no reason to think that the seller 
would make this choice.  Rather, it would take the second unbundled 
choice, in which its profits would be 21 but consumers’ surplus is zero.  
That is to say, if forbidden from tying, the seller will choose to take its 
remaining most profitable alternative.  In this case output would be half as 
much under separate sales as under tying. 
In the illustration, consumers’ surplus under tying (1) is considerably less 
than it is under the second unbundled choice (13).  However, because the 
seller enjoined from tying would take the first choice, the injunction would 
actually reduce rather than increase consumer welfare and also reduce 
output.  In order to make consumers better off, the injunction must not only 
prohibit tying, it must also regulate the price at which Alpha and Beta are 
licensed, forcing the licensor to charge the lower rather than the higher 
price. 
Significantly, different assumptions about consumer willingness to pay 
will yield different outcomes.  In the following example, the buyers have 
different WTP, but in contrast to the first example, the buyers here rank the 
two films in the same order: 
 
 
 
 
Here, the seller could price individually at Alpha=6 and Beta=8 and sell 
only to Customer 1, earning 14 and creating zero consumer surplus.  It 
could also bundle at a price of 11, selling to both customers.  It would earn 
22 and create a surplus of 3.  If it sold individually at a price of 5 for Alpha 
and 6 for Beta, both customers would purchase and the result would be 
exactly the same as tying.  In that case, a policy of tying must have some 
other explanation, such as transaction cost savings. 
One could go on with the illustrations, but the point is that selecting an 
antitrust rule that would maximize consumer welfare without regulating the 
price would require the decision maker to have knowledge in every case of 
each buyer’s willingness to pay, a luxury that most antitrust courts would 
not have.  Further, bundling tends to increase output because the buyers 
 Alpha Beta 
Customer 1  6 8 
Customer 2 5 6 
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necessarily purchase both products.  Single product pricing may or may not 
attain that result, depending on individual customers’ WTP. 
Finally, it is worth noting that bundling of this type generally involves 
product-differentiated goods, all of which are sold at a price higher than 
marginal cost.  As a result, bundling may eliminate double marginalization 
and produce a lower price.  For example, if a theater’s capacity is 100 
movie showings per month and license agreements are a month long, a 
seller offering a package of films covering the entire month is likely to have 
a lower profit-maximizing price than two or three different sellers each 
bidding for a portion. 
C.  Tying and Bundled Discounts of Imperfect Complements 
Often a seller’s profit-maximizing price for a bundle of two (or more) 
goods is lower than the sum of the profit-maximizing prices when the goods 
are sold separately.  The reasons for this can be divided into two types.  
First are economies of joint provision, which are cost reductions that occur 
when the production or distribution of two goods experiences common 
costs or economies of scale or scope.  For example, installing hard drives in 
computers may be much cheaper if it is done with everything else during a 
single trip down the assembly line.  If the computer box must be reopened 
by a separate operator in order to install the hard drive, the sum of the two 
costs could be considerably greater.  As a result, a seller might “tie” 
computers and hard drives.  Alternatively, the packaging, plastic container, 
and inert base material in a medical capsule might be a common cost.  As a 
result, it is cheaper to sell cold sufferers the cough suppressant and the 
decongestant in a single capsule than to sell each of them in a separate 
capsule.39  Such economies related to technical joint production costs are 
typically denominated economies of scope or cost reductions that accrue to 
combining multiple steps or ingredients into a single product or process.  
The general result is the same:  the cost of producing the combination 
together is lower than the cost of producing each good separately.  The 
mere fact that goods are very strong complements does not necessarily 
justify tying because there might not be any efficiencies that accrue from 
joint provision.  For example, an automobile and gasoline may be 
(virtually) perfect complements, but they are not manufactured together and 
are typically not sold together. 
The other reason that combined sales can result in lower prices than 
separate sales is double marginalization.  When two different sellers of 
complementary goods—say, a jar and a lid—each have market power and 
they are unable to coordinate their output, the sum of their individual profit 
 
 39. See David S. Evans & Michael Salinger, Why Do Firms Bundle and Tie? Evidence 
from Competitive Markets and Implications for Tying Law, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 37, 66–68 
(2005). 
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maximizing prices will typically be higher than the combined profit 
maximizing price if one of them sold the two goods together.40 
For example, suppose one firm sells computers and another sells LCD 
monitors.  Further, the LCD monitors are subject to price fixing, which 
reduces the number of LCD monitors sold from 10 million to 8 million.41  
This output reduction injures LCD monitor consumers, but it also injures 
the computer maker, because the computers and LCD monitors are used 
together.  The computer maker does not enjoy any of the profits being 
earned by the LCD monitor cartel, but it does face reduced demand for 
computers. 
In this case, the computer maker can earn more by building its own LCD 
monitor factory and selling a computer/LCD monitor package.  The impact 
will be to restore the demand for its computers and also to destabilize the 
LCD monitor cartel.  Precisely the same thing would occur if the LCD 
monitor market was controlled by a monopolist rather than the cartel.  The 
price that this computer maker charges for the computer/monitor 
combination would be lower than the sum of separate computer and 
monitor prices when the monitors are sold collusively because the 
manufacturer would maximize over the computer/monitor package. 
For reasons of either productive efficiency or elimination of double 
marginalization, a form of allocative efficiency, the combined price of two 
products is often lower than the price of each product when sold separately, 
and in particular when each product is sold separately by different sellers.  
The gains from eliminating double marginalization of this sort usually 
occur only if the seller is assured that it is providing both the tying and tied 
product.  If the pairings of goods covered by these tied-up combinations 
were perfect complements, that would be the end of the story.  Consumers 
and producers would both benefit from tying, and the ties would be 
preferable no matter which welfare theory we picked. 
Perfect complements are goods that are invariably used together—or, 
more technically, situations in which one good has no value unless it can be 
consumed together with the other good.  Relatively few goods are 
absolutely perfect complements.  For example, even the proverbial printer 
and ink cartridge are not perfect complements.  While printers are nearly 
always used with ink cartridges, there is some demand for printers on the 
sets of shows such as The Office, where the printer is used as a stage prop 
and not to print anything. 
Even when tying is the only way to take advantage of the efficiencies that 
result from product complementarity, most goods are in fact not perfect 
complements.  For example, the cold sufferer may want the cough 
suppressant but not the decongestant because she does not need it, it makes 
 
 40. See Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 29, at 940.  In the case of patent 
licenses, see Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. 
L. REV. 1991 (2007). 
 41. See, e.g., In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 781 F. Supp. 2d 955 (N.D. 
Cal. 2011). 
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her drowsy, or she prefers not to take unnecessary medications.  The 
purchaser of a computer may already have a perfectly good monitor, or vice 
versa. 
When complements are imperfect the consumer benefit query becomes 
more complex.  The cold sufferers who want treatment for both symptoms 
unquestionably benefit when they are sold together at a lower price, but the 
one who has only one symptom is worse off.  This is not a “foreclosure” 
injury but one that accrues from an “unwanted tied product.”42 
Imperfect complements present situations when bundled discounts can be 
socially beneficial, giving the cost savings to those who are able to take 
advantage of the bundle, but permitting the separate market to continue for 
those who do not.  For example, suppose that the profit maximizing prices 
of selling A and B separately are A=10 and B=8.  Joint production 
efficiencies permit the bundle to be sold at a profit-maximizing price of 15.  
This could be true either because of productive efficiency gains, such as the 
cold capsule, or elimination of double marginalization.  One group of 
customers uses A and B together.  They will be better off under bundling, 
with welfare savings of 3 per purchase.  However, another group wants A 
alone and place no value at all on B.  For them, the bundle at a price of 15 
imposes consumer losses of 5, and many will not purchase at all at that 
price, reducing the seller’s output. 
In this situation, the profit-maximizing strategy for the seller may be to 
set a bundled price of 15 for A+B, and an unbundled price of 10 for product 
A.  If there are yet other customers who want B without A, it might sell B at 
a price of 8.  Offering a bundled discount will not always be a practical 
strategy because sometimes the cost of segregating production or 
distribution into bundled and unbundled forms is too high.  For example, 
shoes are almost universally sold in tied pairs rather than bundled discounts 
even though there are very likely no economies of scope in joint production.  
Joint distribution is a different matter.  Once it has sold a 15EEE left shoe 
the seller would have to hold the right shoe for someone who wanted it—
very likely many years—or else would have to order a replacement.  In this 
case processing costs may very likely exceed any savings.  These 
conclusions tend to be confirmed by the fact that, with few exceptions, shoe 
sellers refuse to sell individual shoes, even at a price exceeding half of the 
price of the pair, and even though this market seems highly competitive. 
Some writers infer anticompetitive behavior when the seller of multiple 
products raises the price of one or both single product at the time it offers a 
bundled discount.43  While that is a possibility there are alternatives that 
seem more obvious.  The customers who want A alone may be less elastic 
than those who want the A+B bundle.  Once it has segregated the sales via 
 
 42. See 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, ¶ 1724. 
 43. Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly 
Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 468 (2009); cf. Patrick Greenlee, David Reitman & 
David S. Sibley, An Antitrust Analysis of Bundled Loyalty Discounts, 26 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 
1132, 1137 (2008). 
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the bundled discount, the seller additionally engages in third-degree price 
discrimination by charging the standalone A buyers a higher price now that 
it is able to identify them.  Third-degree price discrimination can be shown 
to reduce welfare when output is no higher than under single pricing,44 but 
it can increase welfare when output increases.  For example, to return to the 
story of the computer screen cartel, the computer manufacturer would offer 
a lower price by bundling the computer and the screen.  But it might have a 
set of customers who use its computers for servers and do not require a 
monitor.  The computer maker would then respond by offering a bundled 
discount for the package but pricing separately to the server buyers, 
charging them whatever price maximizes its profits, which could be the 
same, higher, or lower than the old price under strictly separate sales.  
Assessing welfare gains in such a case would require computation of the 
welfare gains accruing to the customers who purchase the bundle, offset by 
or added to the welfare gains or losses suffered by those who purchase the 
single product.  Once again, the baseline is whatever alternative the seller 
would adopt if the bundled discount were prohibited. 
D.  Vertical Restraints and Third-Degree Price Discrimination 
Vertical nonprice restraints have rarely been condemned since the 
Supreme Court’s GTE Sylvania decision in 1977.45  In fact, vertical 
nonprice restraints can facilitate third-degree price discrimination, whose 
potential for competitive harm is greater than the potential for harm from 
the second-degree price discrimination that results from variable proportion 
tying.46  Third-degree price discrimination creates a discontinuity in 
demand that necessarily entails a welfare loss unless the price 
discrimination increases output.47  For example, if a seller charges 
commercial users a price of 100 and home users a price of 60, a commercial 
user who values the product at 99 will not purchase it, but a home user who 
values that unit by 61 will.  The result is a welfare loss of 38 because the 
product is transferred to a lower value buyer.  If the third-degree price 
discrimination transfers only one sale from a higher value to a lower value 
customer, the result reduces consumer welfare, assuming that nothing else 
changes and that output does not increase. 
Vertical nonprice divisions of all kinds—customer, product, or 
territorial—can facilitate third-degree price discrimination by enabling a 
seller to segregate its sales between customers who place different values 
on the product.  For example, hotdogs in the stadium may claim a price of 
 
 44. See Richard Schmalensee, Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-
Degree Price Discrimination, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 242, 242 (1981); Hal R. Varian, Price 
Discrimination, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 600 (Richard Schmalensee 
& Robert D. Willig eds., 1989). 
 45. Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57–58 (1977). 
 46. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, § 11.2d. 
 47. See Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 29, at 935; Schmalensee, supra note 44, 
at 243. 
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$4, while those out on the street can be sold only at $2.  If the hot dog 
manufacturer sells to a stadium vendor at $4, less retailer markup, and to 
the street vendor at $2, the street vendor will begin making stadium sales at 
the higher markup, or else arbitrage its hotdogs to the stadium vendor.  The 
manufacturer will address this problem by restricting each dealer to its 
assigned territory, or perhaps by agreeing with the stadium manager to 
exclude the street vendor from making sales within the stadium.  It must 
also prohibit the transshipping that would occur if the street dealer could 
supply the stadium dealer.  These are typical vertical restraints. 
The difficulty in assessing this practice is that the output impact is so 
difficult to determine.  If forbidden to discriminate, the manufacturer may 
very well forego the street sales altogether.  That will make street buyers 
worse off and not do a bit of good for the stadium buyers.  Once again, 
assessing consumer welfare effects is driven entirely by determining what 
would happen if the price discrimination, or alternatively the territorial 
restraint itself, were forbidden.  To the extent that manufacturers use 
territorial restraints as expansion techniques to capture new sales by 
offering more attractive terms, forbidding them is likely to be harmful 
rather than beneficial to consumers. 
E.  Resale Price Maintenance and Nominally Higher Prices 
A fair amount of data suggests that retail prices are nominally higher 
under resale price maintenance than they would be otherwise.48  One would 
certainly expect that, because if RPM has any impact at all it is to prevent 
price-cutting by certain dealers.  Higher nominal prices do not necessarily 
make for reduced consumer welfare, however.  To the extent that RPM is 
induced by manufacturers in order to control free riding, pricing could be 
higher but consumer welfare could be higher as well.  By contrast, RPM 
induced by a powerful dealer or dealers’ cartel is likely to produce higher 
retail prices that are detrimental to consumers.49  The classical defenses of 
RPM used to defend the practice used two parallel demand curves, with the 
higher one indicating that demand for the good with the RPM-induced 
dealer services was stronger than demand without them.50  Welfare 
improved even though nominal prices were higher because the net effects of 
the increased services plus the induced price were positive.  
But what if the shifted demand curve is not parallel but is less steep, as 
Figure 3 below illustrates?  In this case, more marginal customers (those 
with lower valuations) take a great deal of value from the point-of-sale 
services, while “inframarginal” customers do not.  Intuitively, this seems to 
be a robust presumption.  For example, the marginal purchaser of a 
computer or other technically complex device is likely to be the newbie 
who needs a fair amount of point-of-sale education in order to convince him 
 
 48. See 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, ¶¶ 1628, 1630–33. 
 49. Id. ¶ 1604. 
 50. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, §§ 11.3a, 11.3c. 
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or her of the need for a computer.  The inframarginal customer may be an 
experienced user who does not need such services.  In Figure 4, the 
maintained price with the point-of-sale services is P2, reflecting the higher 
marginal costs (MC2) that the point-of-sale services require the dealer to 
provide.  By contrast, P1 and MC1 represent the lower price and marginal 
cost that accrues from closed box sales without the point-of-sale services.  
Output is a little higher when the services are supplied, thus making RPM 
profitable to the manufacturer.  However, the consumers’ surplus triangle 
above MC2 is definitely smaller than the triangle above MC1, 
notwithstanding MC2’s higher output.  In both cases the retailer is earning 
only a competitive return. 
 
Figure 3 
 
 
The figure illustrates the possibility that consumer welfare can be 
reduced by some instances of resale price maintenance even though the 
particular instance actually increases output.  Of course, this figure, like 
most others, is engineered to illustrate that possibility.  Whether consumers’ 
surplus actually declines depends on a number of factors, including the 
amount of the price increase, the cost of the incremental point-of-sale 
services, and the direction and amount by which the demand curve shifts 
under RPM.  As the proportion of inframarginal customers is lower, RPM 
used for this reason is more efficient.  Making these measurements reliably 
would place heroic burdens on courts except perhaps in obvious situations. 
Problematically, in considering the use of resale price maintenance to 
induce point-of-sale services, it is worth noting that vertically integrated 
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manufacturers who own their service outlets will typically engage in 
precisely the same behavior.  For example, a computer manufacturer with 
franchised retailers might want to use RPM to induce the dealers to invest 
in consumer education provided in the retailer’s store, as the figure 
illustrates.  But if it is profitable for the manufacturer to use RPM in this 
way when it has independent dealers, it is very likely also profitable for the 
manufacturer to provide equivalent point-of-sale services through its wholly 
owned dealers.  Distribution costs would rise, but output would also rise, 
thus profiting the manufacturer.  But in the latter case, we would be using 
antitrust to micromanage a manufacturer’s unilateral decision about what to 
include or not to include in its product/service package.  For example, an 
automobile manufacturer’s decision to include overnight test drives might 
benefit some customers but hurt others who simply pay the increased price 
of the car.  But that hardly turns such decisions into antitrust violations.51 
III.  ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC GOALS 
Beyond general and consumer welfare are other economic concerns that 
legal policy generally should not ignore.  That does not entail, however, that 
antitrust is a necessary or even a useful tool for considering them.  
Typically, a better approach is to limit the use of competition policy to 
make the economy as large as realistically possible by rules that encourage 
both competition and the attainment of technological efficiency.  Having 
made this pie as large as it can be, a secondary set of policies can then be 
used to reallocate some of the resulting wealth in ways that satisfy other 
economic needs, but without doing excessive harm to the efficiency-
encouraging goals of the first set of policies.  For example, if formation of a 
cartel is thought to be necessary to protect less efficient firms from 
bankruptcy, antitrust is better used to prevent the cartel by ignoring the 
bankruptcy defense, but then permit tax or welfare policy to shift some 
resources to employees and perhaps owners of the bankrupt firms.  
Preserving inefficient firms by giving rivals higher price/cost margins 
would be an egregiously inefficient way of protecting small business. 
Many practices that are challenged under the antitrust laws produce 
dislocations in the economy, as do many practices that have no antitrust 
relevance whatsoever.  Plant closings can yield a loss of jobs, as can 
consolidation of distribution chains, whether brought about by merger or 
simple internal reorganization.  Further, these injuries can result in 
competitive as well as noncompetitive markets. 
 
 51. See id. §11.3c; William S. Comanor, The Two Economics of Vertical Restraints, 21 
SW. U. L. REV. 1265 (1992); Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, The Economics of Resale 
Price Maintenance, in 3 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1841 (Wayne D. Collins 
ed., 2008); Lawrence S. White, Resale Price Maintenance and the Problem of Marginal and 
Inframarginal Customers, 3 CONTEMP. POL’Y ISSUES 17 (1985).  The basic theory of the 
inframarginal consumer comes from A. Michael Spence, Monopoly, Quality, and 
Regulation, 6 BELL J. ECON. 417 (1975). 
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Consider, for example, the merger between competing gasoline producers 
who have a sufficiently small market share that no price impact results.  To 
the extent the merger produces any efficiencies, the producers will be better 
off and consumers will be either better off or indifferent.52  However, one 
consequence of the merger is that the two firms consolidate various 
gasoline stations and eliminate some jobs.53  Should antitrust policy 
intervene in this case in order to protect these jobs? 
The injury in this case has absolutely nothing to do with competition 
policy.  Even if two tiny restaurants in Manhattan or London should merge, 
with no market-wide consequences whatsoever, the result might very well 
be some consolidation.  For example, the consolidated restaurant may 
require only one head chef rather than two.  Indeed, if a single owner of two 
restaurants should close one of them and consolidate its operations, that 
result could follow even if the market shares involved are trivial. 
 
Figure 4 
Suppose we permit a merger to monopoly in order to sustain a faltering 
firm.  In Figure 4, the rectangle over the left side of the marginal cost 
function (MC) represents a wealth transfer from consumers to the post-
merger monopoly.  The triangle over the right side of MC represents a 
deadweight loss that accrues to neither producers nor consumers.  The 
figure illustrates the rare but pedagogically helpful situation where demand 
 
 52. In a perfectly competitive market the efficiencies produced by a merger are not 
“passed on” to consumers through the price mechanism, because the market price is 
invariant to the costs of any single firm.  Rather, the firm will increase its production at the 
market price. 
 53. Cf. Reibert v. Atl. Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir. 1973) (denying a fuel 
distributor standing to sue after it lost its position after a consolidation brought about by the 
Atlantic/Texaco merger). 
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is linear and marginal costs are constant.  In that case, the wealth transfer is 
precisely double the deadweight loss, so we can measure them as 2X and X, 
respectively.  In the figure, the wealth transfer is 16 and the deadweight loss 
is 8.  Under ordinary assumptions of demand curves (that are convex to the 
origin) and rising marginal costs, this ratio will be different and typically 
the deadweight loss will be larger than half the wealth transfer. 
This merger provides the merging firms with gains of 16, assuming that 
the market was competitive prior to the merger.  However, it does so at a 
cost to consumers of 24.  The tax and transfer system is not costless either, 
so the mere fact that there is a 50 percent premium on the financial support 
to these merging firms is not dispositive against it.  However, the 
administrative cost in the tax system is paralleled in this case by acquisition 
costs as well as the administrative expenses of the merger investigation, 
which could be quite costly given that we wish to measure employment or 
other effects as well as the competitive effects of the merger.  The 
deadweight loss must be added on top of these administrative costs.54 
Further, there is no reason for thinking that the private gains of 16, which 
this merger facilitates, are the correct amount to deal with the potential loss 
of employment in this market.  The gains to be had from monopoly are a 
function of market structure, market share, and consumer behavior.  The 
potential employment losses are a function of firm specific factors or the 
state of the economy as a whole that have little to do with these numbers.  
That is, giving the postmerger firm 16 may be too much, just right, or too 
small an amount to address the employment issue. 
Further, because the merger creates a monopoly, the gains run across the 
postmerger firm’s entire output, even though the only output that was at risk 
for loss of jobs is that of the acquired firm.  If the merger facilitates 
collusion rather than creating monopoly, the nonmerging rivals will also be 
able to reduce output and raise the price.  Permitting the merger effectively 
pays a subsidy to all the firms in the industry even though only a small 
portion of them are in financial distress. 
In sum, permitting the anticompetitive merger in order to protect 
employment in the postmerger market seems seriously wasteful of 
resources.  And this analysis considers only short-run consequences.  In the 
process of permitting this merger, we might also be reducing the incentive 
to innovate or placing a price umbrella over obsolete technology or 
inefficient administration, which explains why the acquired firm was in 
financial distress in the first place.  All of these losses would be overhead 
on our financial assistance to the distressed firm or its employees. 
 
 54. One factor to be considered is the incidence and shifting of any tax and transfer 
system.  If the tax is nothing more than a price increase by another name (with part of the 
revenue going to the government and then paid back to the firms), then the impact of the tax 
may not be all that different from permitting the merger to monopoly, with the important 
differences that the government can choose who and how much will be paid out.  Direct 
taxes such as income taxes, however, ordinarily cannot be shifted. 
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As a second example, consider a dominant firm that acquires a superior 
technology that operates at lower variable costs than other firms in the 
market.  This firm can engage in exclusionary pricing by charging a price 
above its own costs that is nevertheless too low to permit rivals to survive.  
In the short run, jobs and other resources could be lost.  Antitrust could 
respond by (1) doing nothing, provided that the prices are above cost, which 
is more or less what we currently do; (2) force the firm to increase its price 
sufficiently to permit the rivals to survive; or (3) require the firm to share its 
technology with smaller rivals. 
Setting aside distributive concerns, we are now in somewhat 
ambiguous territory on the competition policy questions.  Reasonable 
people disagree about whether above-cost pricing should ever be predatory 
and also whether and when dominant firms should be required to share 
technology with rivals.  However, to the extent that these questions relate to 
concerns about competition and total market output, they are not addressed 
to wealth distribution as such.  Our question is whether competition policy 
should favor such constraints on dominant firms in favor of smaller 
competitors even when they are acknowledged to be inefficient.  Their 
appeal is that they protect a class of persons (presumably small business) 
that we deem worthy of protection. 
Forced sharing of an essential input might be thought justified on 
distributive grounds, even though it cannot be shown to lead to higher 
output and lower prices.  Assuming the forced sharing was completely 
welfare neutral, perhaps that argument would have one kind of force.  But 
the arguments against forced-sharing rules—such as the essential-facility 
doctrine—are that forced sharing reduces welfare, at least in the long run, 
because it eliminates incentives for independent development or 
innovation.55  Firms that have a legal entitlement to procure a resource from 
the dominant firm have a reduced incentive to develop alternatives for 
themselves. 
The analysis for productive efficiency is roughly similar.  For example, 
we might use competition law in order to preserve an obsolete technology 
or to protect inefficient small businesses that have higher costs than 
dominant firms.  A good example of such a use is the Brown Shoe 
decision,56 which condemned a merger in an industry where market shares 
were so small that monopoly or cartel pricing was not plausible.  What the 
merger did, however, was exacerbate a trend toward larger production 
facilities and vertical integration that was driving smaller shoe stores out of 
business.  The government argued that the merger was unlawful because 
these smaller firms would have to compete either against lower priced or 
higher quality shoes.57 
 
 55. See 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, ¶¶ 771–72.  
 56. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
 57. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Markets in Merger Analysis, 57 ANTITRUST BULL. 887 
(2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1945964. 
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In every one of these cases, use of antitrust policy seems like a socially 
costly way of getting to a result that might be perfectly defensible on 
general policy grounds but that imposes high direct costs and a plethora of 
indirect and unforeseen costs.  Whether or not protecting or subsidizing 
inefficient firms may be justified on grounds of general policy, using 
antitrust law to achieve that goal does not seem sensible, given the costs 
and uncertainty of the benefits.  Further, as the illustrations suggest, these 
criticisms apply to both underuse and overuse of antitrust—that is, both to 
situations such as the merger case where antitrust is not applied for 
distributive reasons, and to the unilateral pricing or dealing case, where it is 
applied for purely distributive reasons. 
CONCLUSION 
When one considers both efficiency and administrability, consumer 
welfare emerges as the most practical goal of antitrust enforcement.  In 
cases where consumer effects are more or less uniform, the consumer 
welfare principle usually requires smaller amounts of information to 
implement and avoids the costs and numerous errors associated with any 
kind of balancing of welfare gains and losses to different groups.  In fact, 
antitrust policy almost never balances except in cases where there is nothing 
to put on one side of the scale or weighting differences are so great as to 
make the balancing solution simple and obvious. 
This simplicity largely disappears, however, in cases where a practice 
impacts different groups of consumers in different ways and it is impossible 
to segregate those portions creating a consumer benefit from those that 
result in consumer harm.  In these hard cases, decision makers may have to 
rely on secondary indicators or intuitions about net harm.  When no firm 
conclusions can be drawn about consumer impact, the existence of producer 
gains becomes relatively more important.  For example, if a tying 
arrangement produces significant producer gains but impacts different 
consumers differently and net harm or benefit is impossible to determine, 
then the law should be reluctant to intervene. 
